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JUDICIAL VALOUR AND THE WARREN COURT'S
LABOR DECISIONS
Theodore J. St. Antoine*
L AWYERS who practice regularly before the Supreme Court are
likely to prepare their arguments with a specific Justice in
mind. The choice does not necessarily turn on who might be the
swing vote in a given case. Often it is just a matter of which Justice
can be relied upon, because of his particular interests and his in-
sight, to search out the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing
positions, and to see that all the hard questions are asked. In a labor
case during the early years of the Warren Court, that would usually
have meant Justice Frankfurter. Later on, depending on the circum-
stances, it might have been Justice Harlan or Brennan or Fortas.
It has probably never been the Chief Justice.
Yet now as I look back upon the whole sweep of the Warren
Court's labor decisions over the past decade and a half, I am struck
by the sudden suspicion that many members of the Supreme Court's
labor bar' may have outsmarted themselves. They were, perhaps,
like the fabled fox who knew many things; they failed to recognize
that it was the Chief Justice who knew the One Big Thing. For the
major contribution of the Warren Court to the development of
labor law has not depended on the kind of subtle statutory inter-
pretation that is needed to wend one's way through the labyrinthine
secondary boycott passages of the Taft-Hartley Act. Instead, the
Court's main achievement in the labor field involved a simple but
fundamental restructuring of intergovernmental relations. What the
Court did, in a series of decisions that were hotly controverted at
the time but have quietly won general acceptance since, was to
nationalize the regulation of labor relations in industries affecting
interstate commerce. The Court's action reflected the same charac-
teristically audacious Warren approach toward established state in-
stitutions which was displayed in dealing with reapportionment and
civil rights.
The importance in the Court's eyes of "federal pre-emption"-
the exclusion of state substantive law from areas regulated by Con-
gress-can be shown to an extent simply in quantitative terms. Some-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1951, Fordham College;
J.D. 1954, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1. In fairness I should mention that I was a junior member of this group (as
union counsel) for about half the span of the Warren Court. No one could be more
guilty than I of the accusation in the text.
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what arbitrarily, I have labelled about 110 labor decisions of the
Warren era as "important." Of these, almost forty-or over a third
-- deal either directly with the metes and bounds of the pre-emption
doctrine, or with issues which would not have arisen but for the
displacement of state law by federal.2 I shall discuss the cases in two
categories: those decisions concerned with the extent to which state
law may still operate in areas subject to federal regulation; and
-hose decisions concerned with the development of federal law to
replace state law as the basis for enforcing collective bargaining
agreements. Thereafter, I shall add a few words about some of the
other significant labor decisions of the Warren Court.
At the time Chief Justice Warren assumed office, the pre-emption
doctrine in its application to labor relations was still in its adoles-
cence. The well-nigh axiomatic principle had been established that
a state could not directly impede the exercise of federal rights of
self-organization, for example, by imposing onerous licensing re-
quirements on union agents. 3 But states were still free to regulate
such labor activities as "quickie" strikes, which technically were
neither protected nor prohibited under federal law.4 More impor-
tant, no clear rationale had been evolved to justify conclusions that
particular kinds of conduct fell either within or without the ambit
of state regulation. And there had been little airing of the under-
lying policy considerations which go to the very heart of our federal
system: the balancing of the need for a uniform national policy in
matters affecting the country as a whole against the need to accom-
modate regional differences and desires for local experimentation.
The first term of the Warren Court ushered in the vanguard
elements of today's pre-emption theory. In Garner v. Teamsters
Unions the Court held that a state injunction could not duplicate
a federal remedy by forbidding conduct proscribed under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. Diversity of procedures was said to be as
apt to produce conflicting adjudications as diversity of substantive
cules. It soon became apparent, however, that a majority of the Court
-egarded a deficiency in the federal remedy as a sufficient reason for
;ustaining state jurisdiction. Thus, employees or employers suffering
nonetary losses through tortious conduct that was also an unfair
2. Chief Justice Warren himself authored eleven opinions in the approximately
,10 cases I surveyed; five dealt with pre-emption. His opinions included four dissents,
:hree on this subject. The Chief Justice has consistently been one of the most pro-
pre-eaption members of the Court.
3. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
4. UAW-AFL v. WERB [Briggs & Stratton Corp.], 336 U.S. 245 (1949). For a more
recent approach, see Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
5. 346 US. 485 (1953).
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labor practice could maintain a state court action for damages, since
the National Labor Relations Board had no general power to award
full compensatory relief.; At this juncture Chief Justice Warren
stepped in to protest a state's awarding damages, especially punitive
damages, for conduct regulated by the federal labor statutes. As he
saw it, the uniformity of regulation by which Congress sought to
secure nationwide industrial peace would be undermined by the
numerous variations in state laws and the "provincialism" of local
juries.7
The Warren views did not entirely prevail, but their influence
was plainly felt in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,8
which remains the Court's most definitive statement on pre-emption.
There the Court in handling the pre-emption issue shifted from an
emphasis on the nature of the state relief sought (was it more ade-
quate than the federal remedy?) to an emphasis on the nature of
the activity in question (was it regulated under federal law?). The
now-famous test was enunciated that if conduct is "arguably" pro-
tected by section 7 of the NLRA, or "arguably" prohibited by sec-
tion 8, exclusive primary jurisdiction rests in the NLRB and state
(or federal) courts are precluded from acting. Earlier decisions which
had appeared to rely on the deficiency of the federal remedy were
explained as upholding state court jurisdiction because violence or
threatened violence was present, or because the activity was of
"merely peripheral concern" to the federal statutory scheme.9
The soundness of all this surely is not self-evident. Under the
expansive pre-emption doctrine, states have been sharply limited in
the role they can play as "laboratories" for social experiment.
Numerous restrictions have been imposed on customary state fun-
dons. Thus, although the states can still assert their police power to
maintain public order, they cannot take over a public utility to halt
a strike.10 Laws not dealing specifically with labor relations, such as
state antitrust statutes" and even traditional common-law libel doc-
trines,1 2 may also run afoul of the pre-emption principle. This is so
6. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954); UAW
v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
7. UAW v. Russell, 356 US. 634, 650-51 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
8. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
9. 359 U.S. at 241-43, citing United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,
347 U.S. 656 (1954) (threatened violence); UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (mass
picketing); IAM v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958) (wrongful expulsion of member from
union).
10. Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees Div. 1287 v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74
(1963).
11. TeamsteiiLocal 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.. 283 (1959).
12. Cf. Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (libel action
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even though it is by no means clear that Congress is as eager as the
Supreme Court would suggest to ensure the unsullied uniformity
of federal regulation.' 3 In extending the pre-emption doctrine, the
Court nonetheless moved boldly ahead, willing to risk local losses to
achieve national gains, and willing too, it would seem, to risk
congressional displeasure for reading more into the statute than the
legislature may have intended.
On balance, I think the Court has acted wisely. Labor law con-
tinues to be one of our most divisive domestic issues, and much of
the divisiveness runs along regional lines. Federally enforced uni-
formity thus seems peculiarly necessary, lest either unions or em-
ployers be unduly favored in particular states. Such regional varia-
tions could hardly fail to have an adverse impact on the nation's
economy. For example, plants might be lured from place to place
while labor bitterness constantly deepened. The present healthy
trend toward a leveling of wage rates for similar jobs across the
country could well be reversed. Of course, a different result in
almost any given Supreme Court pre-emption decision would doubt-
less not have had dire consequences. But by now we probably have
sufficient experience under the Court's broad pre-emption doctrine
to conclude that vital local interests have in fact suffered no serious
injury. This alone may be enough to indicate that the Court was
right when it began to tip the scales, as a matter of general policy,
in favor of national interests rather than local concerns.
The Warren Court's vigor in furthering the primacy of federal
law was demonstrated even more -strikingly in its rulings on the
enforcement of collecti-ve bargaining agreements. Labor contracts
were traditionally enforced in accordance with state substantive law.
It was often hard to sue a union in the state courts, however, because
of the difficulty of obtaining jurisdiction over an unincorporated
association. Therefore, in 1947, Congress wrote section 301 into the
Taft-Hartley Act 14 to provide that suits on contracts between unions
and employers could be brought in the federal district courts.
Unions 'were explicitly made competent to sue or be sued as entities.
But what was the substantive law to be applied in 301 suits-
federal or state? If section 301 were to be treated as merely pro-
cedural, with state substantive law applicable, the provision would
maintainable only if defamation in course of labor dispute is malicious and actually
injurious).
13. When Congress enacted the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959 to provide the first
comprehensive federal regulation of internal union affairs, it specifically negated any
general intent to exclude concurrent state regulation. See 29 US.C. § 523 (1964).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
[Vol. 67:317
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be of dubious constitutionality; article III of the Constitution con-
fines the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to cases involving
diversity of citizenship or a federal question. Yet section 301 was
silent on the question of applicable law, and Congress had furnished
no clear guidance.
After one earlier inconclusive skirmish, 15 the Supreme Court
came to grips with the problem in Textile Workers Union v. Lin-
coln Mills.16 A union sued an employer in federal court for specific
performance of the arbitration provisions in the parties' collective
contract. Jurisdiction was contested. Justice Douglas, for the Court,
cut the constitutional knot with one swift stroke, declaring that "the
substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law which
the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws."X
Once this was established, jurisdiction could constitutionally be
reposed in the federal judiciary.
Perhaps the magnitude of the Court's undertaking in Lincoln
Mills can best be gauged by attending to the highly literate criticism
leveled at the decision in a classic article by Professors Alexander
Bickel and Harry Wellington of the Yale Law School.'8 The authors
point out, quite correctly, that Justice Douglas' previously quoted
conclusion, "which intrudes upon state power, which finds no sup-
port in the language of the statute and insignificant support in the
legislative history, received no explanation in the opinion."'9 But
their ultimate objection to Lincoln Mills is far more profound. With
an almost mystical concern for the institutional integrity of the
judiciary, Bickel and Wellington argue that section 301, as read by
the Supreme Court, demands of the federal courts a task to which
they are "enormously unequal," and "its imposition on them is
therefore capable of damaging their usefulness for the essential
duties that they are suited to perform." 20 The authors concluded that
when Congress confers responsibilities upon the federal courts which
are beyond their institutional capabilities, the proper disposition is
a "remand" of the matter to Congress for further consideration.
Remand is to be achieved through "any form of dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction which does no violence to the statutory language." 2'
15. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
348 U.S. 437 (1955).
16. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
17. 353 U.S. at 456. Justice Frankfurter dissented in a massively documented eighty-
six-page opinion in which he sought to show that § 301 did not create substantive
rights but was only procedural. 353 U.S. at 460.
18. Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 H~Av.
L. rv. 1 (1957).
19. id. at 35-36.
20. Id. at 22-23.
21. Id. at 35.
December 1968]
HeinOnline  -- 67 Mich. L. Rev.  321 1968-1969
Michigan Law Review
The task shouldered by the Supreme Court, despite the grave
apprehensions of Bickel and Wellington, was the task of fashioning
a body of federal contract law to govern the enforcement of collec-
tive agreements. Its sources were to be the policies of the federal
labor statutes, state contract law where appropriate, arbitrators' deci-
sions, and so on. Bickel and Wellington looked at these "bits and
pieces" and were aghast; the Court had faith that "judicial inventive-
ness" would find a way.22 Perhaps that is the difference between
professors and practical men. By hindsight, at any rate, it is hard to
find justification for the fears of the two perceptive Yale critics.
Possibly an explanation for the easy survival of the federal judi-
ciary lies in the next maneuver executed by the Warren Court.
Having boldly staked out a claim in Lincoln Mills to the whole of
the labor contract domain, the Court then turned around in the
Warrior trilogy2 3 and delegated to arbitrators the principal responsi-
bility for interpreting and applying collective bargaining agree-
ments. Courts are to order arbitration of grievances under a contract
"unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. '24 Moreover, an arbitrator's award is to be enforced by a
court without a review on the merits, so long as the award is not the
product of fraud or capriciousness. Thus, through the Warrior ap-
proach, the Court may have finessed many of the problems envisaged
by Bickel and Wellington.
Even so, the Warren Court has managed to build up a fairly
substantial body of basic contract doctrine. For instance, a labor
agreement may be binding on a successor employer even though he
has not signed it.25 Available grievance and arbitration machinery
has to be exhausted before there can be resort to a court suit on a
contract.26 And in the absence of a federal statute of limitations,
state statutes apply to section 301 actions..27 These are the kinds of
questions one might have anticipated the Court would have to
resolve. They hardly seem a threat to its institutional capacities.
Perhaps the most nettlesome current issue of labor contract en-
forcement is the impact of the Norris-La Guardia Act. Here, more
than anywhere else, the Supreme Court may be open to the charge
22. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
23. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior &c Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel &c Car Corp., 363 US. 593 (1960).
24. United Steelworkers v. Warrior &c Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
25. John Wiley &c Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
26. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery Workers, Local 50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 US. 650 (1965).
27. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 US. 696 (1966).
[Vol. 67:317
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that it failed to think through the implications of applying federal
substantive law to suits brought under section 301. So far, the Court
has held that the Norris-La Guardia injunction ban does not pre-
vent specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate,28 but that
it does prevent an injunction by a federal court against a strike in
breach of contract. 29 Two embarrassing questions are left. Does
Norris-La Guardia prevent a decree ordering specific performance of
an arbitrator's award directing a union to halt a strike? And, does
Norris-La Guardia apply to prevent a state court injunction against
a strike in breach of contract? 0 If the last question is answered
"yes," that will be an ironic denouement to the Taft-Hartley Con-
gress' efforts to increase the range of employer remedies against
unions. If the question is answered "no," the anomaly may be that
state courts will become, by employer choice, the principal formu-
lators of federal law in this important area.3' These logical diffi-
culties could have been avoided if the Supreme Court had applied
state substantive law in Lincoln Mills. The chances are, however, the
Court would have come out the same way even if it had foreseen
these problems. For the policy tug of having uniform federal law
govern contract enforcement would have remained. And in a conflict
between logic and policy, the Warren Court has never been prone
to favor logic.
Several other labor doctrines of the Warren Court mirror the
libertarian philosophy that has permeated the Chief Justice's tenure.
At least two should be mentioned-free speech and individual
rights.
After being in eclipse for almost a decade,32 the concept of peace-
ful picketing as a form of free speech protected by the first amend-
ment enjoyed a resurgerce in the late years of the Warren Court.
In one case the Court engaged in some rather strained statutory
interpretation to reach the conclusion that the 1959 amendments to
the Taft-Hartley Act do not forbid consumer picketing aimed at a
particular nonunion product being distributed by a neutral re-
tailer;3 3 otherwise, difficult constitutional questions might have been
raised. In another case the Court held that a state court injunction
28. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 US. 448 (1957).
29. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
30. State courts retain jurisdiction to enforce collective agreements, but they must
apply federal substantive law under § 301. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
31. Union removal of § 301 suits from state to federal court may solve this dilemma.
See Avco Corp. v. Machinists Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
32. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 US. 284 (1957).
33. NLRB v. Fruit 9: Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760 [Tree Fruits],
377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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against the peaceful picketing of a business in a privately owned
shopping center violated the first amendment.34 The Court went on
to say that ordinarily picketing can be forbidden only when it has
an illegal end, and rejected the notion that the nonspeech aspects
of picketing render the first amendment completely inapplicable.
The Court also rewrote the legislative history of the union security
provisions of the Railway Labor Act for the purpose of avoiding
first amendment issues. In two different cases the Court held that
the Act prevented railroad unions from using dues money collected
from employees under a union shop agreement for political pur-
poses, if the employees objected.35
One of the most dramatic developments of the last half decade
has been the rapid extension of employees' rights to fair representa-
tion in the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining
agreements. An individtiai employee now may sue his employer for
breach of contract, and may join the union or sue it alone if it has
treated him arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith.36 An employee
has no absolute right to have a grievance arbitrated,3 7 however, and
he must first pursue any remedies available under the contract
before he can file suit.38 Important questions in this area await the
Court's future attention. Do honesty and conscientiousness excuse
any union blunder? Do certain employee rights "vest" so as to be
immune from further union-employer bargaining? To what extent
may the courts intrude to protect individual rights without impair-
ing effective collective bargaining? This may well be the area in
which the Warren Court has left the most unfinished business.
In a celebrated little essay Sir Frederick Pollock remarked, "Cau-
tion and valour are both needed for the fruitful constructive inter-
pretation of legal principles."3 9 I suspect that others besides Profes-
sors Bickel and Wellington have doubts about the Warren Court on
the score of caution. My own feeling, however, is that most of its
forays are set off by retrenchments. States may not regulate conduct
covered by the NLRA; but an exception is carved out for malicious
and harmful libel. The courts shall assume responsibility for writing
a body of federal contract law; but the day-to-day task is delegated
to the arbitrators. Is that not "caution" as well as "valour"? In any
event, if I nwast choose between the two in a field like labor law, the
icbke is plain.
34. Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
35. IAM v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373
U.S. 113 (1963).
36. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
37. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
38. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
39. Tudidal Caution and Valour, in JuaspsRuENcE N Act'oN 367, 373 (1953).
HeinOnline  -- 67 Mich. L. Rev.  324 1968-1969
